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Résumé : Cet article reconsidère l’impact de l’introduction de la dette pu-
blique dans le cadre de marchés incomplets et de ﬂuctuations macroécono-
miques. Aiyagari et Mc Grattan (1998) montrent que l’incomplétude des mar-
chés et l’existence d’une contrainte d’endettement créent un motif d’épargne
de précaution qui réaﬃrme le rôle de la dette publique. Parce qu’elle oﬀre un
moyen additionnel aux ménages de lisser leur consommation, l’introduction
de la dette publique est bénéﬁque. Cependant, cette analyse ignore une source
non négligeable d’exacerbation du risque idiosyncrasique de revenu non as-
surable qu’est le risque agrégé et risque donc d’avoir sous estimé le rôle de
la dette. L’accroissement du taux et de la durée du chômage lors des phases
de récession entame la capacité assurantielle de l’épargne de précaution. En
outre, l’occurrence de faibles taux d’intérêt durant les périodes de récession
rend plus coûteuse la constitution d’une épargne de précaution. L’introduction
de la dette publique accroît le taux d’intérêt. L’épargne de précaution devient
moins coûteuse. C’est la raison pour laquelle le niveau optimal de dette pu-
blique est égal à 5% du produit annuel et s’établit en moyenne à un niveau
plus élevé que dans un environnement dépourvu de ﬂuctuations macroécono-
miques.
Abstract : This paper assesses the long-run optimal level of public debt
in a framework where aggregate ﬂuctuations are taken into account. House-
holds are subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and the market
structure prevents them from perfectly insuring against risk. We ﬁnd that the
long-run optimal level of public debt is generally higher in a setting embed-
ding aggregate ﬂuctuations than in a setting without. Aggregate ﬂuctuations
modify both the cost and the motive for precautionary saving. Higher levels
of public debt, by eﬀectively reducing the cost of precautionary saving, help
agents to smooth consumption when they face price and employment ﬂuctua-
tions.
Mots-Clés : dette publique, risque agrégé, épargne de précaution, contrainte
de crédit
Key words : public debt, aggregate risk, precautionary saving, credit constraints
JEL classification : E32, E62, H31
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1 Introduction
The introduction of uninsurable risk was a major step in the recent litera-
ture on public debt. Woodford (1990) is the ﬁrst author to depart from the
complete market framework to consider credit constraints or as he phrases
it "imperfect ﬁnancial intermediation". Woodford (1990) builds a simple eco-
nomy embedding credit constraints and ﬁnds that public debt can be eﬃcient
because it keeps interest rates higher and closer to time preference rates. Aiya-
gari and McGrattan (1998) quantitatively address the question of the optimal
level of public debt in a heterogeneous agent, incomplete market model. Ca-
librating on the U.S. economy they ﬁnd the annual positive debt over GDP
ratio of 2/3 to be optimal. Finally, Floden (2001) uses a similar framework
to look at public debt/transfers optimal combinations. This author underlines
the strong uncertainty and inequality implications behind public debt poli-
cies. Very much in the same way, the introduction of uninsurable risk in the
literature on the cost of business cycles has generated rich implications. In an
eﬀort to reconsider the small welfare eﬀect of business cycles found by Lucas
(1987), both Krusell and Smith (2002) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(2001) draw a link between the aggregate risk and the cross sectional distri-
bution. In other words, the aggregate productivity shock is correlated to the
individual speciﬁc shocks to produce strong distributional eﬀects of aggregate
ﬂuctuations. In such a framework, these authors ﬁnd a greater cost of business
cycles than Lucas (1987). Even more interestingly, Imrohoroglu (1989) brieﬂy
suggests that economic policies could be used to help individuals reduce the
cost of business cycles. In this paper, we explore this latter suggestion and its
implications for the optimal level of public debt.
This paper’s main objective is to introduce a framework exhibiting aggregate
ﬂuctuations à la Den Haan (1996) or Krusell and Smith (1998) to quantify the
long-run optimal level of public debt. As aggregate ﬂuctuations impact the sa-
ving behavior of agents, they are an important aspect to take into account for
public debt policies that has been ignored so far. Unlike previous literature,
this paper also takes some steps to reproduce the wealth distribution of the
targeted U.S. economy as it has been documented that the need for public
debt is very diﬀerent across the population. Thus our framework can be used
to decompose the eﬀects of public debt along the cycle and also across the
population. Following Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari type models, we build a pro-
duction economy with capital market imperfections where a large number of
ex-ante identical inﬁnitely-lived agents face idiosyncratic income shocks and
aggregate productivity shocks. Households’ saving behavior is inﬂuenced by
precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. Private capital and
government bonds, both yielding the same interest, can be claimed to insure
against future risk. Government levies proportional taxes on households and
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issues debt in order to ﬁnance its consumption.
In this setup, our benchmark calibration yields a long-run optimal level of pu-
blic debt of 5% of GDP on an annual basis. This is to be compared to a model
without aggregate ﬂuctuations. We consider several methods of removing ag-
gregate ﬂuctuations to obtain a comparable long-run idiosyncratic risk model.
The level of public debt obtained in those idiosyncratic models are generally
lower although with one method the optimal level of debt is almost similar
to the aggregate risk model. Thus we argue that the eﬀect of aggregate risk
on the optimal level of public debt is moderate. In the benchmark economy,
we ﬁnd that the gains of being at the optimal level of debt instead of the
benchmark debt to GDP ratio of 66% amounts to 0.257% of consumption.
Also, the consumption gains of being at the optimal level of debt are higher in
recessions than in expansions and higher for the poorest percentile of the po-
pulation. The intuition behind our results is the following. Credit constraints
and uncertainty lead agents to engage in precautionary saving. The result of
precautionary saving is a higher level of capital that in turn lowers the inter-
est rate away from the time preference rate. Aggregate ﬂuctuations, as it is
correlated with the labor market process, exacerbate the level of risk faced
by agents. An employment fluctuation effect increase both the risk of losing
one’s job and the time one could spend in unemployment in recessions. This
strengthens households’ precautionary saving motive. A price fluctuation ef-
fect changes the level of prices between recessions and booms making it more
costly to accumulate precautionary saving in recessions. As a result of these ef-
fects, the capital stock rises and the interest rates move further away from the
time preference rate. A higher level of public debt has two opposing eﬀects
here. A crowding out effect crowds out private capital and reduces welfare.
A cost of precautionary saving effect increases the interest rate, reduces the
cost of precautionary saving and enhances welfare. Because the employment
fluctuation effect and the price fluctuation effect change the precautionary sa-
ving motive and cost, the cost of precautionary saving effect is stronger in an
aggregate ﬂuctuations setting than in an idiosyncratic risk setting. Thus the
optimal level of public debt is higher in a setting with aggregate ﬂuctuations.
Finally, we emphasize that the optimal level of debt can be signiﬁcantly higher
if we modify the parameters governing the employment fluctuation effect so
as to strengthen this eﬀects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the bench-
mark economy. Section 3 details the results. In section 3.5 we characterize the
optimal level of public debt for the European labor market. The last section
concludes.
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2 The Benchmark Model
Our benchmark economy is a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari type dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model augmented to allow aggregate ﬂuctuations à la
Den Haan (1996) or Krusell and Smith (1998) and public debt. Insurance
markets are incomplete. Agents face idiosyncratic and aggregate risks and are
borrowing constrained. These three assumptions lead agents into precautio-
nary saving (Aiyagari (1994)). Our benchmark model can be related to the
model in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) but present three deviations of im-
portance apart from its aggregate ﬂuctuations feature. First, the productivity
process here is simpler as agents can only be employed or unemployed. Second,
leisure is not valued. Those two deviations greatly simplify the model with ag-
gregate ﬂuctuations. Finally, there is no exogenous growth in our benchmark
economy. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) specify an exogenous annual growth
rate of 1.85%. This assumption exogenously reduces the cost of public debt
for individuals since public debt interest repayments are diminished by this
exogenous growth factor. It is noteworthy that making this assumption lead
to a higher optimal level of public debt.
2.1 Firms
We assume that there is a continuum of ﬁrms which have a neoclassical pro-
duction technology and behave competitively in product and factor markets.
The output is given by :
Yt = ztF (Kt, Nt)
where K is aggregate capital and N aggregate labor used in production. The
function F exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to K and N , has
positive and strictly diminishing marginal products, and satisﬁes the Inada
conditions. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ. The economy is subject
to an exogenous aggregate shock noted z. There are two possible aggregate
states : a good state where z = zg and a bad state where z = zb. The aggregate
shock follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process with transition probability ηz|z′ =
Pr(zt+1 = z
′/zt = z). Thus ηz|z′ is the probability that the aggregate state
tomorrow is z′ given that it is z today. We note η the matrix that describes
the transition from one aggregate state to another such that :
η =

 ηgg ηgb
ηbg ηbb


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Finally, our setting assumes that inputs market are competitive. The wage w
and the interest rate r verify :
rt + δ = ztFK(Kt, Nt) (1)
wt = ztFN(Kt, Nt) (2)
2.2 The government
The government issues public debt and levies taxes to ﬁnance public expenses.
Both the revenue of capital and labor are taxed proportionally at an identical
rate τ . The government’s budget constraint veriﬁes :
Gt + rtBt + TRt = Bt+1 −Bt + Tt
with
Tt = τ(wtNt + rtAt)
Gt is the level of public expenses, Bt the level of public debt, Tt tax reve-
nues and TRt a lump sum transfer to households that amounts to zero at
the equilibrium. Because of the aggregate ﬂuctuations property of the model,
we have to be cautious about how we close the model with respect to the
government budget constraint. We proceed as follows. As there is no formal
steady state in this economy because of the aggregate ﬂuctuations property,
we approximate a pseudo steady state by averaging aggregate variables over
long periods of time. We ﬁrst guess an interest rate in this pseudo steady state
and derive a tax rate by assuming that public expenses and public debt are
a constant fraction of the associated long run GDP. As this tax rate does not
necessarily balance the government budget constraint along the cycle, we use
the lump sum transfer TR to make sure the budget will be balanced. Finally,
we update our guess on the interest rate in the pseudo steady state until we
reach a ﬁx point. When this ﬁnal step is completed, the model is closed with
respect to the government budget constraint and TR amounts to zero at the
equilibrium 1 .
At accounts for total average wealth in the economy. It is the sum of average
physical capital K and public debt B such that :
At = Kt +Bt (3)
1More details can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex ante identical inﬁnitely lived
households of unit mass. Their preferences are summarized by the function
V :
V = E0


∞∑
t=0

 t∏
j=0
βju(ct)



 (4)
where β is the discount factor. We assume that this discount factor is random.
Thus the discount factor β can diﬀer across agents and can vary over time. We
specify that the latter follows a three-states ﬁrst-order Markov process. This
assumption on the discount factor helps to reproduce the wealth distribution
as shown in Krusell and Smith (1998). The discount factor veriﬁes :


β0 = 1
βj≥1 ∈]0; 1[
ct is the household level consumption. The utility function we use has a stan-
dard CRRA speciﬁcation and writes :
u(c) =


c1−σ
1−σ
if σ 6= 1
log(c) if σ = 1
Agents are subject to idiosyncratic unemployment shocks. Let s be the house-
hold’s labor market status. A household can either be unemployed (s = u) or
employed (s = e). Households are also subject to shocks at the aggregate level.
Aggregate shocks exacerbate idiosyncratic unemployment risks. The unem-
ployment rate and the unemployment duration are higher in recessions than
in booms. Therefore, transitions on the labor market are correlated to the ag-
gregate state. We note Πzz′|ss′ the joint transition probability to a state (s
′, z′)
conditional on a state (s, z). The matrix that jointly describes the transition
from a state (s, z) to a state (s′, z′) is the following :
Π =


Πbbuu Πbbue Πbguu Πbgue
Πbbeu Πbbee Πbgeu Πbgee
Πgbuu Πgbue Πgguu Πggue
Πgbeu Πgbee Πggeu Πggee


where Πggee = Pr(zt+1 = zg, st+1 = e|zt = zg, st = e).
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When agents are in an employed state, they receive the wage w. However
when agents are unemployed their income corresponds to their home produc-
tion that we note θ. Insurance markets are incomplete so that agents can only
partially self-insure against idiosyncratic risk. Following Aiyagari and McGrat-
tan (1998) no borrowing is allowed. The only way for households to self-insure
against idiosyncratic risk is to accumulate physical capital and government
bonds both yielding the same return r. Their overall holding in the later as-
sets is noted a. Therefore a typical household solves the following problem :
max
ct, at+1
E0{
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
j=0
βj)u(ct)},
subject to :
at+1 + ct = (1 + (1− τ)rt)at + χ(st)wt + TRt
ct ≥ 0
at+1 ≥ 0
with
χ (st) =


θ if st = u,
(1− τ) if st = e
The existence of aggregate risk leads us to distinguish between individual state
variables and aggregate state variables. The individual state variables are given
by the vector (a, s, β). The aggregate state variables are summarized by the
vector (z,Γ) where Γ(a, s, β) is a distribution of agents over asset holdings, em-
ployment status and preferences. To determine the wage and the interest rate,
households need to forecast the aggregate stock of physical capital. Therefore,
they need to know the wealth distribution. That is why wage and interest
rate depend on that wealth distribution. In the computational appendix, we
explain how we avoid manipulating the wealth distribution by approximating
it with some of its moments using the methodology developed in Den Haan
(1996) and Krusell and Smith (1998). We detail the computational strategy
we used to solve the model in appendix A.
2.4 Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium consists of a set of decision rules for consumption
and asset holding {c(a, s, β; z,Γ), a′(a, s, β; z,Γ)}, aggregate capital K(z,Γ),
factor prices {r(z,Γ), w(z,Γ)}, tax rate τ and a law of motion for the distri-
bution Γ′ = H(Γ, z, z′) which satisfy these conditions :
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(i) Given the aggregate states, {z,Γ}, prices {r(z,Γ), w(z,Γ)} and the law of
motion for the distribution Γ′ = H(Γ, z, z′), the decision rules {c(a, s, β; z,Γ), a′(a, ǫ, β; z,Γ)}
solve the following dynamic programming problem :
v(a, s, β; z,Γ) = max
c, a′
{u(c) + βE [v(a′, s′, β ′; z′,Γ′)|(s, β; z,Γ)]}
subject to :
c+ a′ = (1 + r(z,Γ)(1− τ))a + w(z,Γ)χ(s) + TR
c ≥ 0
a′ ≥ 0
and
Γ′ = H(Γ, z, z′)
(ii) Market price arrangements are :
r(z,Γ)= zFK(K,N)− δ
w(z,Γ)= zFN (K,N)
(iii) Government budget constraint holds.
(iv) Capital market verify :
K +B =
∫
a′(a, ǫ, β; Γ, z)dΓ
(v) Consistency : agents’ optimization problem is satisﬁed given the law of
motion H and the law of motion is consistent with individual behavior.
2.5 Calibration
For the sake of comparison, the model economy is calibrated to match certain
observations in the U.S. data. We let one period in the model be one quarter
in the data. To avoid confusion we have converted all values to their annual
equivalents in the results section. To remain simple and allow comparisons, we
closely follow Krusell and Smith (1998) when calibrating the characteristics
of the labor market and the aggregate risk.
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2.5.1 Technology
We choose the production function to be Cobb-Douglas :
Yt = ztF (Kt, Nt) = ztK
α
t N
1−α
t 0 < α < 1
Technology parameters are standard. The capital share of output α is set to
0.36 and the capital depreciation rate δ is 0.025. As Krusell and Smith (1998)
we assume that the value of the aggregate shock z is equal to 0.99 in recessions
(zb) and 1.01 in booms (zg).
2.5.2 Preferences and discount factor
In the benchmark economy we assume a logarithmic utility function. We now
detail the calibration steps to generate a realistic wealth distribution, the
observed U.S. wealth Gini index and the capital-output ratio. Here, our ca-
libration diﬀers from Krusell and Smith (1998). In their economy agents can
borrow whereas here, for the sake of comparison and simplicity, we follow
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and no borrowing is allowed. To reproduce
the shape of the U.S. wealth distribution we ﬁrst assume that unemployed
agents receive income too and ﬁx the home production income θ to be 0.10 2 .
This assumption produces a large group of poor agents. Next we use the prefe-
rence heterogeneity setting discussed in Krusell and Smith (1998) to generate
a long thick right tail 3 . We impose that the discount factor β takes on three
values {βl, βm, βh} where βl < βm < βh :

βl
βm
βh

 =


0.9750
0.9880
0.9985


Thus an agent with a discount factor βm is more patient than an agent with
a discount factor βl. To calibrate the transition matrix, we impose that the
invariant distribution for discount factors has 10% of the population at the
lowest discount rate βl, 70% at the medium discount factor βm and 20% at the
highest discount factor βh. As Krussell and Smith (1998) we assume that there
is no immediate transition between extreme values of the discount factors.
Finally, we set the average duration of the lowest discount factor and the
2 This corresponds to about 12% of the average wage at the equilibrium.
3 There are several ways to reproduce a thick right tail. One would be to give
rich agents higher propensity to save or higher returns on saving for instance by
introducing entrepreneurs (e.g., Quadrini (2000)). For the sake of simplicity we
explore here the preference heterogeneity setting introduced by Krusell and Smith
(1998).
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Tab. 1
Distribution of wealth : Benchmark model and data
Held by Top Gini
Source 1% 5% 10% 20%
Benchmark Model 22 52 71 89 .82
Data 30 51 64 79 .79
Held by Bottom
Source 20% 40% 60% 80%
Benchmark Model 1 2 4 11
Data 0 1 6 18
highest discount factor to be 50 years (200 quarters). These assumptions yield
the following transition matrix 4 :
Υ =


0.9950 0.005 0.0000
0.0007 0.9979 0.0014
0.0000 0.0050 0.9950


The conditions that we have described so far specify 10 parameters so 10
targets are needed. When we account for the Gini index and the capital-
output ratio, we need 8 additional targets. Given our calibration strategy,
those 8 targets would be 8 points from the U.S. wealth distribution. In practice,
instead of targeting 8 speciﬁc points, we searched for a set of parameters so
that the wealth distribution in the model economy is as similar as possible to
its U.S. counterpart.
As shown in Table 1 this calibration does a fairly good job at approximating
the shape and the skewness in the U.S. wealth distribution 5 and yields a Gini
index of 0.82 and a capital-output ratio of 10.6 6 .
4 For further details on the calibration of this matrix, see appendix B.
5 The data we report on the U.S. distribution comes from Krusell and Smith (1998)
and Budria-Rodriguez, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2002).
6 The value of the capital-output ratio can change with the definition of capital.
Here we adopt the definition in Quadrini (2000). Thus aggregate capital results
from the aggregation of plant and equipment, inventories, land at market value,
and residential structures. This definition is close to the findings of Prescott (1986)
and is also used for instance in Floden and Linde (2001). This yields a capital-
output ratio of 2.65 on an annual basis that we convert to its quarterly equivalent
of 10.6.
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2.5.3 Labor market processes
For the sake of simplicity our calibration of the aggregate shock and the labor
market process follows Krusell and Smith (1998). The process for z is set so
that the average duration of good and bad times is 8 quarters. Therefore, the
transition matrix η for aggregate state changes is deﬁned by :
η =

 0.8750 0.1250
0.1250 0.8750


The average duration of an unemployment spell is 1.5 quarters in good times
and 2.5 quarters in bad times. We also set the unemployment rate accordingly :
in good periods it is 4% and in bad periods it is 10%. These assumptions enable
us to deﬁne the transition matrixes for labor market status for each aggregate
state change : Πgg for a transition from a good period to a good period, Πbb
for a transition from a bad period to a bad period, Πgb for a transition from
a good period to a bad period and Πbg for a transition from a bad period to
a good period 7 :
Πbb =

 0.6000 0.4000
0.0445 0.9555

 Πbg =

 0.2500 0.7500
0.0167 0.9833


Πgb =

 0.7500 0.2500
0.0729 0.9271

 Πgg =

 0.3333 0.6667
0.0278 0.9722


Finally the joint transition matrix Π for labor market statuses and aggregate
states can be deﬁned as :
Π =

 ηbbΠbb ηbgΠbg
ηgbΠ
gb ηggΠ
gg

 =


0.5250 0.3500 0.0313 0.0938
0.0388 0.8361 0.0021 0.1229
0.0938 0.0313 0.2916 0.5833
0.0911 0.1158 0.0243 0.8507


2.5.4 Government
We ﬁx the ratio of government purchases to GDP to 0.217. The debt over
GDP ratio, noted b is set to the quarterly value of 8
3
which is equivalent to an
7 Further details on this calibration can be found in Appendix B.
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annual value of 2
3
. Those values are the observed ratios in the U.S. as reported
by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998).
3 Results
We now present the results obtained with our benchmark economy. A ﬁrst
section reports the aggregate behavior of the model. A second examines the
long-run welfare eﬀects of public debt in an aggregate ﬂuctuations setting. In
a third, we move on to the business cycle and distributional eﬀects of public
debt. In the next to last section we compare the benchmark economy to simpler
idiosyncratic risk only models. Finally, we explore an alternative calibration
that changes the labor market process.
3.1 Public debt in an aggregate fluctuations setting
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Fig. 1. Aggregate behavior of the benchmark model
We start by discussing the aggregate behavior of our benchmark model. Our
computations are reported in Figure 1. Increasing the level of public debt in-
creases the supply of safe assets in the economy. Consequently, the before tax
interest rates increases. Because the repayment of debt interests are higher,
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the income tax rate increases. Nevertheless, the after tax interest rate unam-
biguously increases. In turn, public debt has a crowding out eﬀect on private
capital : higher levels of debt decrease the aggregate amount of private capital
in the economy. The crowding out of capital induces the observed decline in
output 8 . However, the decline in physical capital is smaller than the increase
in public debt. The increase in the after-tax interest rate reduces the gap bet-
ween the after-tax interest rate and the rate of time preference. The cost of
postponing consumption to build up a buﬀer stock of saving is then reduced.
Households choose to hold more assets at the steady state equilibrium. That
is why the overall wealth level A, which is the combination of private capital
and public debt, is higher.
3.2 Welfare analysis and optimal level of debt
The welfare analysis we conduct below apply to the long run optimal level of
public debt with aggregate ﬂuctuations. As there is no formal steady-state in
a model with aggregate ﬂuctuations, we consider for our welfare analysis the
values of aggregate variables averaged over long periods of time for a given
debt to GDP ratio 9 . We deﬁne the optimal level of public debt as the debt
over GDP ratio that maximizes the traditional utilitarian welfare criterion µ.
As explained in Lucas (1987) and Mukoyama and Sahin (2006), this criterion
measures the amount of consumption that one would have to remove or add
in order to make the agent indiﬀerent between the benchmark debt over GDP
ratio and some other level of public debt. It veriﬁes :
E0

 ∞∑
t=0

 t∏
j=0
βj

 log((1 + µ)cbench.t )

 = E0

 ∞∑
t=0

 t∏
j=0
βj

 log(ct)


with
{
cbench.t
}∞
t=0
the consumption stream in the benchmark model when the
debt over GDP ratio is equal to 8
3
. {ct}
∞
t=0 is the consumption stream when
the debt over GDP ratio is some other level than the benchmark level. For
logarithmic utility we can show that :
µ = exp
([
V − V bench.
]
/S
)
− 1,
where V bench. = E0
[
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
j=0
βj
)
log(cbench.t )
]
, V = E0
[
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
j=0
βj
)
log(ct)
]
and
8 the increase in wealth would have been the same as the increase in public debt.
The steady state consumption would have been higher.
9More details can be found in Appendix A.
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S = E0
[
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
j=0
βj
)]
.
The result of the introduction of public debt on welfare is a priori undetermi-
ned because of two opposing eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is a crowding out effect.
The crowding out of physical capital clearly reduces consumption and then
welfare. Moreover the increase in the income tax rate tends to amplify the
negative impact of public debt on welfare. The second eﬀect is a cost of pre-
cautionary saving effect : the increase in the after-tax interest rate makes it
less costly to accumulate precautionary saving in order to smooth consump-
tion as the interest rate gets closer to the time preference rate. This second
eﬀect is welfare enhancing 10 . It is diﬃcult to predict which eﬀect overcomes
the other analytically.
Figure 2 depicts the long-run optimal level of debt in the benchmark economy.
In a setting embedding aggregate risk and calibrated on the U.S. economy, the
optimal public debt level is 5% of output on an annual basis. Aggregate ﬂuc-
tuations, idiosyncratic risk and credit constraints lead agents to engage in
precautionary saving in order to smooth consumption. Without public debt,
the cost of precautionary saving is higher because when households accumu-
late, the interest rate lowers. Any level of public debt, raises the interest rate
and reduces the cost of precautionary saving. As a result welfare is enhanced.
However any level of public debt also crowds out private capital and reduces
welfare. Here, a lower level of debt than the benchmark level increases welfare
out of reducing the crowding out of private capital. At the same time, a lo-
wer level of debt than the benchmark level decreases welfare out of increasing
the cost of precautionary saving. As long as the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the se-
cond, a lower level of debt is optimal. At the optimal level, one eﬀect exactly
balances the other. For a debt over GDP ratio smaller than 5%, the consump-
tion loss out of increasing the cost of precautionary saving is higher than the
consumption gain out of reducing the crowding out of private capital.
As illustrated in Table 2, going from the benchmark level of debt to the op-
timal level of debt is welfare enhancing. The consumption gain of being at
the optimal level of debt instead of the benchmark level is 0.257%. On the
contrary, it is welfare decreasing to go to a higher level of public debt than the
benchmark level. In an economy where the level of debt is 75%, the consump-
tion loss not to be at the benchmark level (resp. optimal level) would be on
average 0.072% (resp. 0.329%). These results suggest that the role the interest
rate plays in reducing the cost of precautionary saving is central to understand
10Woodford (1990) argues that welfare can be enhanced if the interest rates are
kept high enough, that is, closer to time preference rates in a liquidity-constrained
economy. We find the same effect here.
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Fig. 2. Welfare gain versus debt/GDP ratio in the benchmark model
Tab. 2
Consumption gain (%) of going to the optimal level of debt in the benchmark eco-
nomy
Business Cycle
Population Average Recessions Booms
All 0.257 0.267 0.247
Bottom 10% 0.885 0.901 0.868
Top 10% -10.401 -10.535 -10.264
why agents settle for the optimal level of public debt. If we block any price
movements by considering a price ﬁxed small open economy, it appears that
there is no consumption gains or losses out of the cost of precautionary saving
effect. In the case where all prices are set to their average benchmark level
for any level of public debt, there is no consumption loss out of increasing the
cost of precautionary saving for a lower level of public debt than the bench-
mark level. In this case, there are only consumption gains out of reducing the
crowding out of private capital.
3.3 Business cycles and distributional effects
In this section we move on to the eﬀects of public debt along the cycle and
across the distribution of the population. To generate statistics along the cycle,
we compute separately the average value of our aggregate variables either when
the economy is in boom or when it is in recession over the whole sequence
of simulation. The last two columns of Table 2 illustrate the consumption
gain or loss of being at the optimal level of debt instead of the benchmark
level. In recession, the consumption gain of being at the optimal level of debt
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is higher than on average. On the contrary, in expansion this consumption
gain is lower. This is due to a price fluctuation effect : in recessions, the cost
of postponing consumption to build up a buﬀer stock of savings is higher
because the interest rate is lower as shown in Table 3. In expansion, we have
the opposite : interest rates are higher and the cost of precautionary saving
is lower. The ﬂuctuation of prices is not the only relevant eﬀect we need
to account for to explain the optimal level of public debt. When we take
aggregate risk into consideration, an employment fluctuation effect modiﬁes
the precautionary saving motive. Along the cycle, the unemployment rate
and duration increase in recessions and reduce in booms. In recessions, the
precautionary motive becomes stronger : employed agents face a higher risk
of loosing their job and unemployed agents ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job.
In recessions agents want to save more for precautionary motives because of
the employment fluctuation effect but at the same time the price fluctuation
effect raises the cost of saving. Thus public debt helps reducing the cost of
precautionary saving in recessions. In booms, agents want to save less because
of the employment fluctuation effect. At the same time the price fluctuation
effect makes it less costly to save. Thus public debt is less useful in booms.
Tab. 3
Macro variables along the cycle in the benchmark economy
Level of debt (% of output)
66 5
Statistics Booms Average Recessions Booms Average Recessions
Agg. Capital 12.23 12.17 12.10 12.58 12.52 12.46
Output 1.18 1.14 1.11 1.20 1.16 1.12
Before Tax Interest Rate (%) 0.99 0.90 0.80 0.93 0.83 0.74
Before Tax Wage 0.7902 0.7900 0.7899 0.7982 0.7981 0.7980
The overall consumption gains or losses of a change in the level of public debt
is shared very diﬀerently in the population. To show that we decompose the
welfare gains of going from the benchmark level of public debt to the optimal
level across the population. The last two rows of Table 2 show this decompo-
sition. For instance, the row Bottom 10% shows the welfare gap between the
10% least fortunate people living in an economy with the benchmark level of
public debt and those living in an economy with the optimal level of public
debt. This decomposition closely matches a decomposition by wealth levels as
the lowest (resp. highest) expected utilities refer to people who have experien-
ced the highest unemployment (resp. employment) spells and who end up with
the lowest (resp. highest) level of assets. The poorest agents are better oﬀ with
a lower level of public debt than the optimal level. Going from the benchmark
level of debt to the optimal debt level leads to an increase in consumption of
0.885% for the poorest 10% of the population. In the meantime, the richest
10% of the population would loose as much as 10.401% of consumption. This
is explained by the fact that rich people’s income is mainly capital income
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whereas poor people’s income is mostly labor income. Thus when the level of
public debt is higher, poor people suﬀers from the reduction in output caused
by higher tax rates, lower wages and crowding out of capital. On the contrary,
as interest rates raise with higher level of public debt, rich people are better
oﬀ. The same type of eﬀects are discussed in Ball and Mankiw (1995) and
Floden (2001).
3.4 Optimal level of debt without aggregate fluctuations
In this section we look at setups without aggregate ﬂuctuations and compare
them with our benchmark economy. There are several ways of eliminating
business cycles 11 to derive a comparable long run idiosyncratic model. We
look at three methods.
3.4.1 Imrohoroglu (1989) method
In the spirit of Lucas (1987) we replace the aggregate stochastic process with
its conditional mean. We then follow Imrohoroglu (1989) to derive the labor
market process. The transition probabilities of this economy are set so that
the average rate of unemployment and the average duration of unemployment
are the same between this economy and the benchmark economy. All other
calibrated parameters are kept to their benchmark values, especially time pre-
ference rates and the risk aversion parameter 12 . This model is similar to the
benchmark model in many ways : higher levels of debt raise interest rates and
crowd out private capital, overall wealth increases with debt and taxes are
higher. But as the risk faced by agents is lower, agents save less and interest
rates are higher in this model.
Figure 3 (top) depicts the welfare proﬁle we ﬁnd in this idiosyncratic risk
model. The optimal level of public debt is 2.5% of output on an annual basis.
This level is lower than the level we found in the benchmark economy. This is
because there is no price fluctuation effect and employment fluctuation effect
in this economy. In the benchmark economy, as the unemployment rate and the
unemployment duration increase during recessions, the precautionary motive
is stronger. Moreover, in the benchmark economy the interest rate and the
physical capital are smaller in recessions. Therefore, it is more costly to save for
precautionary motive. That is why the need for public debt is more important
in the benchmark economy. In the idiosyncratic model the risk is lower because
11 For a survey, see Barlevy (2004).
12 For greater details on the models without aggregate risk and their calibration, see
appendix C.
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Fig. 3. Welfare gain versus debt/GDP ratio in idiosyncratic models
agents are subject to a less risky labor market and at the same time they no
longer face price ﬂuctuations. The precautionary motive is weaker here than
in the benchmark model and agents save less. As a consequence interest rates
are at a higher level in this economy.
3.4.2 Brute-force averaging
This method is related to the ﬁrst one above. We again set the aggregate pro-
cess to its conditional mean. The transition probabilities on the labor markets
are generated as follows. We take the exact same transition process as in the
benchmark economy and repeat it over very long periods of time. Thus we
create a history of transition on the labor market conditional on the aggre-
gate risk faced by agents. In the end of this simulation, we are left with a
sequence of aggregate shocks and corresponding labor market situations for
individuals. We then brute-force average the sequence of labor market transi-
tions out. To do so, we count the numbers of transitions from unemployed to
unemployed, from unemployed to employed, from employed to employed and
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from employed to unemployed over the entire simulated sequence and then
take the mean. As we simulate over very long periods of time, we respect the
law of large numbers. After brute-force averaging over the simulated series,
we are left with a transition matrix on the labor market. The matrix we get
by brute-force averaging is very similar to the matrix obtained by the Imro-
horoglu method above. Figure 3 (middle) depicts the welfare proﬁle we ﬁnd
in this idiosyncratic risk model. The optimal level of public debt is 2.5% of
output on an annual basis. We can characterize this optimal level in the same
way as we did above.
3.4.3 Conditional approach
In this section we consider an alternative method of removing business cycles
to obtain a long-term idiosyncratic model by conditioning on the aggregate
state. First, as above, we equate the aggregate process to its conditional mean.
To obtain the labor market process, we condition on the aggregate state. For
instance, we compute the probability of being employed tomorrow conditional
on being employed today πee in the idiosyncratic model as follows :
πee = Pr(z = zg|s = e)∗(Πbgee+Πggee)+(1−Pr(z = zg|s = e))∗(Πgbee+Πbbee),
where for instance Πggee = Pr(z
′ = zg, s
′ = e|z = zg, s = e).
This means that to ﬁnd who will remain employed in the next period conditio-
nal on being employed today, we consider all occurrences of being employed
tomorrow conditional on being employed today in every aggregate state of
the benchmark calibration and we weight them accordingly by the probability
of being in either good or bad state conditional on being employed. We ap-
ply the same method to derive πuu. The remaining probabilities are found by
applying the raws summing to unity property of the idiosyncratic transition
matrix. This method of removing aggregate risk yield a more persistent labor
process than the methods above. Notably, the probability of remaining unem-
ployed tomorrow conditional on being unemployed today is higher. Thus the
unemployment rate is not equal to its average value in the benchmark model.
Here the unemployment rate is higher and amounts to 7.33% instead of an
average value of 7% in the benchmark model.
We ﬁnd that the optimal level of debt is higher here than with the methods
above. The annual optimal debt to GDP ratio is only slightly lower than 5%
and is almost identical to the optimal level of debt found is the benchmark
model with aggregate risk. This result is depicted in Figure 3 (bottom). It
is straightforward to see why the optimal level of debt is higher with this
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methods. As both the persistence of the labor market process and the unem-
ployment rate are higher, public debt plays a greater role in reducing the cost
of precautionary saving here than with the methods above. We illustrate this
in the next section with the benchmark economy.
3.5 Higher unemployment rate and longer unemployment spells
Our benchmark calibration reﬂects the behavior of the U.S. labor market. In
this section we consider an alternative calibration of the labor market, that
is a step towards reproducing European labor market features although we
do not take into consideration or reproduce the employment beneﬁt system
found in Europe. We follow the methodology used in Algan and Allais (2004)
and the data set of Blanchard and Wolfer (2000). We only modify the labor
market features and leave the rest of the calibration unchanged. We ﬁx the
unemployment rate to be 13% in recessions and 7% in booms. We also set
the duration of an unemployment spell to be 6 quarters in recessions and 4
quarters in booms. We now ﬁnd the optimal level of debt to be 30% on an
annual basis as depicted in Figure 4. Longer unemployment spells and higher
unemployment rates tend to raise the optimal level of debt.
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Fig. 4. Welfare gain versus debt/GDP ratio in the model with higher unemployment
rate and longer unemployment spells.
This calibration purposely strengthens the employment fluctuation effect :
unemployed agents have a harder time ﬁnding a job in this economy when
compared to the benchmark economy and employed agents face a higher risk of
loosing their jobs. In recessions, this is ampliﬁed. The precautionary motive is
stronger here than in the benchmark economy. The harder it is for households
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to smooth consumption and the higher is the need for public debt. Here a
higher level of public debt is needed to help households eﬀectively smooth
consumption.
4 Conclusion
This paper reconsidered the optimal level of public debt in an environment of
aggregate ﬂuctuations. Our benchmark model calibrated on the U.S. economy
ﬁnds that a positive public debt level of 5% of output on a annual basis is
optimal. This level is generally higher than in an economy without aggregate
ﬂuctuations. Our benchmark economy shows that in an aggregate ﬂuctuations
setting, households are subject to an employment fluctuation effect and to a
price fluctuation effect. These eﬀects make the precautionary saving motive
stronger and at the same time the cost of saving higher. Our results suggest
that the higher supply of safe assets induced by higher levels of public debt
tends to raise the interest rate. This helps households to reduce the cost of
precautionary saving and make smoothing of consumption easier. As a result
there are welfare gains in the economy. However for the poorest agents, higher
levels of debt are not optimal. Poor agents rely mainly on labor income and
are dependent on higher wages and lower taxes. Public debt decreases wages
and increases tax level thus poor agents prefer lower levels of public debt. We
also emphasize thatlonger unemployment spells tend to raise the optimal level
of public debt.
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Appendix
A Computational strategy
We solve the model using the methodology developed by Den Haan (1996) and
Krusell and Smith (1998). They show that agents need only a restrictive set of
statistics about the wealth distribution to determine prices. This set includes
the mean of the wealth distribution and the aggregate productivity shock. A
linear prediction rule based only on the average level of capital provides an
accurate prediction. This result comes from the near linearity of the decision
rule a′(a, s, β; z,Γ). As the aggregate capital stock is mainly held by rich people
who have approximately the same propensity to save, next period’s aggregate
capital is accurately predicted by current period’s aggregate capital. In our
model, we assume the following law of motion :
log(K¯ ′) = a0 + a1z + a2 log(K¯)
where K¯ ′ and K¯ denote respectively the average stock of capital of the next
period and of the current period. Thus the strategy is the following :
(Step 1) : Given a set of parameter values (a0, a1, a2) for the law of motion,
we solve the individual problem. To solve the individual problem, we iterate
on the Euler equation :
U ′(c) = E [β ′U ′(c′)(1 + r′(z′,Γ′)(1− τ))/s, β; z,Γ] ,
on a discrete grid until a ﬁx point is found. When the borrowing constraint
bind, the solution can be deduced from the budget constraint.
(Step 2) : Given the parameter values for individual decision rules, we solve
the aggregate problem i.e. the coeﬃcients of the law of motion.
(Step 3) : If the parameters (a0, a1, a2) found are close to the parameter values
used to solve (Step 1), the algorithm has converged. Otherwise (Step 1), (Step
2) and (Step 3) are repeated until convergence.
(Step 4) : Because of the aggregate ﬂuctuations property and the government
budget constraint, on more step is necessary. As there is no formal steady
state in an economy with aggregate ﬂuctuations, we approximate a pseudo
steady state by averaging aggregate variables over long periods of time. We
ﬁrst make a guess for the interest rate in this pseudo steady state, and with
the long run budget constraint of the government, we derive a valid tax rate
23
for this pseudo steady state. Also, the amount of public debt in the economy is
deﬁned according to this pseudo steady state by taking the appropriate ratio
of the GDP in the pseudo steady state. Given the tax rate we just deﬁned,
we execute the above steps 1, 2 and 3. When those steps have converged, we
update our guess of the interest rate in the pseudo steady state until a ﬁx
point is found.
When step 4 is complete, the pseudo steady state interest rate coincide with
the average interest rate in the actual economy with aggregate ﬂuctuations,
the government budget constraint is balanced and the lump sum transfer to
individuals amounts to zero at the equilibrium.
B Calibration
We now show how we derived the transition matrices for aggregate state
changes (η), for joint transition between aggregate states and labor market
statuses (Π) and for discount factor changes (Υ).
B.1 Aggregate state change transition matrix
To deduce the aggregate state change transition matrix η, we solve the follo-
wing system :
ηgg = ηbb
ηbg = ηgb
ηgg + ηgb = 1
ηbb + ηbg = 1
ηbg =
1
8


=⇒

 0.875 0.125
0.125 0.875


As we assumed that the duration of a boom or a recession is the same, we
deduce the two ﬁrst equations. Moreover, the duration of a cycle is set to 8
quarters, it follows that ηbg = Pr(zt+1 = g/zt = b) =
1
8
and ηgb = Pr(zt+1 =
b/zt = g) =
1
8
.
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B.2 Matrix for joint transition between aggregate states and labor market
statuses
The determination of the matrix Π that describes the transition between
unemployment and employment requires the identiﬁcation of the aggregate
shock (whether we are in a recession or in a boom). The transition matrix Π
is built thanks to the matrix η and to the transition matrixes Πgg, Πbb ,Πgb
and Πbg. Π veriﬁes :
Π =

 ηbbΠbb ηbgΠbg
ηgbΠ
gb ηggΠ
gg


We assumed that in recessions the duration of the unemployment, that we
note durub, amounts to 2.5 quarters and the unemployment rate ub is set to
10%. In booms, the duration of unemployment, durug, is equal to 1.5 quarters
and the unemployment rate, ug, is set to 4%. From this information, we can
deduce the matrices Πgg and Πbb.
The transition matrix Πgg corresponds to the case (z, z′) = (g, g). It veriﬁes :
Πgg =

Πgguu Πggue
Πggeu Π
gg
ee


Solving the system below gives the values of Πggee , Π
gg
eu, Π
gg
ue and Π
gg
uu :


Πggee +Π
gg
eu = 1
Πggue +Π
gg
uu = 1
Πggue =
1
durug
Πggee = 1−
ugΨ
gg
ue
1− ug
=⇒ Πgg =

 0.3333 0.6667
0.0278 0.9722


The transition matrix Πbb corresponds to the case (z, z′) = (b, b). It veriﬁes :
Πbb =

Πbbuu Πbbue
Πbbeu Π
bb
ee


Solving the system below gives the values of Πbbee, Π
bb
eu, Π
bb
ue and Π
bb
uu :
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

Πbbee +Π
bb
eu = 1
Πbbue +Π
bb
uu = 1
Πbbue =
1
durub
Πbbee = 1−
ubΠ
bb
ue
1− ub
=⇒ Πbb =

 0.6 0.4
0.0445 0.9555


When the cycle changes the unemployment rate changes. The transitions bet-
ween unemployment and employment get modiﬁed. We make the same as-
sumptions as Krusell and Smith (1998) :


Πbguu = Pr(ǫt+1 = u
g/ǫt = u
b) = 0.75Πgguu
Πgbuu = Pr(ǫt+1 = u
b/ǫt = u
g) = 1.25Πbbuu
The probability to remain unemployed when the next period is a recession
(resp. boom), increases (resp. decreases) since by assumption the unemploy-
ment rate is higher in recession than in boom.
The transition matrix Πbg corresponds to the case (z, z′) = (b, g). It veriﬁes :
Πbg =

Πbguu Πbgue
Πbgeu Π
bg
ee


The system below gives us Πbgee, Π
bg
eu, Π
bg
ue and Π
bg
uu :


Πbgee +Π
bg
eu = 1
Πbgue +Π
bg
uu = 1
Πbguu = 0.75Π
gg
uu
Πbgee =
((1− ug)− ubΠ
bg
ue)
1− ub
=⇒ Πbg =

 0.25 0.75
0.0167 0.9833


The transition matrix Πgb corresponds to the case (z, z′) = (g, b).
Π
gb=

Πgbee Πgbeu
Πgbue Π
gb
uu


The system below gives us Πgbee, Π
gb
eu, Π
gb
ue and Π
gb
uu :
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

Πgbee +Π
gb
eu = 1
Πgbue +Π
gb
uu = 1
Πgbuu = 1.25Π
bb
uu
Πgbee =
((1− ub)− ugΠ
gb
ue)
1− ug
=⇒ Πgb =

 0.75 0.25
0.0729 0.9271


B.3 Matrix for discount factor changes
We assumed that the discount factors follow a three-states ﬁrst-order Markov
process. Therefore, the matrix describing the transition from the discount
factor βi to the discount factor βj is the following :
Υ =


Υll Υlm Υlh
Υml Υmm Υmh
Υhl Υhm Υhh


As we assumed that there is no immediate transition between βl and βh as
in Krusell and Smith (1998), it involves that Υlh = Υhl = 0. Moreover, as
we set the duration of the extreme states (βl and βh) to 50 years namely 200
quarters, we have Υlm =
1
200
= Υhm. Solving the following system gives us the
transition matrix Υ :
Υll +Υlm +Υlh = 1
Υml +Υmm +Υmh = 1
Υhl +Υhm +Υhh = 1
Υlh = Υhl = 0
Υlm =
1
200
= Υhm
Υml =
Pr(βt=βl)Υlm
Pr(βt=βm)
Υmh =
Pr(βt=βh)Υhm
Pr(βt=βm)


=⇒ Υ =


0.995 0.005 0
0.0007 0.9979 0.0014
0 0.005 0.995


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C Model without aggregate risk
We now brieﬂy detail the model without aggregate risk and its calibration.
Most of this model is similar to the benchmark model, thus we underline only
diﬀerences.
Model
As this model serves comparison purposes most of the benchmark assumptions
remain unchanged. The assumptions about the representative ﬁrm are similar
with the exception of the technical progress z. In the absence of aggregate
risk, z is ﬁxed to its average value. In the absence of aggregate risk, the budget
constraint of the government is :
Gt + rtBt = Bt+1 − Bt + Tt
Household preferences are unchanged. In the absence of aggregate risk, the
matrix that describes the transition on the labor market becomes :
π =

πuu πue
πeu πee


with πuu = Pr(st+1 = u|st = u). When there is no aggregate risk, it is no longer
necessary to distinguish the nature of the cycle. In the absence of aggregate
risk, the state variables are summarized by the vector (a, s, β). The program
the household solves is :
v(a, s, β) = max
c, a′
{u(c) + βE [v(a′, s′, β ′)|(s, β)]} (C.1)
subject to :
c+ a′ = (1 + r(1− τ))a + wχ(s) (C.2)
c ≥ 0 (C.3)
a′ ≥ 0 (C.4)
with
χ (s) =


θ if s = u,
(1− τ) if s = e
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Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium consists of a set of decision rules for consumption
and asset holding {c(a, s, ), a′(a, s, β; z,Γ)}, aggregate capital K, factor prices
{r, w}, tax rate τ satisfying these conditions :
(1) Given the prices {r, w}, the decision rules {c(a, s, β), a′(a, ǫ, β)} solve the
dynamic programming problem (C.1) subject to the constraints (C.2),
(C.3) and (C.4)
(2) Market price arrangements are :
r=αzKα−1N1−α − δ
w= (1− α)zKαN−α
(3) Government budget constraint is balanced.
(4) Capital Market clears when :
K +B =
∫
a′(a, ǫ, β)dΓ(a, s, β)
with Γ(a, s, β) the distribution of agents over asset holdings, employ-
ment status and preference.
Calibration
We present here the calibration strategy in an economy without aggregate risk.
The calibration of the preferences, the discount factors and the behavior of the
government are unmodiﬁed. The calibration of z and the characteristics of the
labor market diﬀer in the absence of aggregate risk. In an economy without
aggregate risk, z is constant and set to the average value of the aggregate
shock, namely the unit value. As we consider three alternative calibration of
the idiosyncratic labor process, we detail them sequentially.
In the Imrohoroglu method, the unemployment rate u and the unemployment
spells duru are respectively set to 7% and 2 quarters (we average over good
and bad periods in the benchmark model). These two assumptions deﬁne the
transition matrix π :
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

πuu + πue = 1
πeu + πee = 1
πue =
1
duru
πee = 1−
uπue
1− u
=⇒

 0.5 0.5
0.0376 0.9624


In the brute-force averaging method, we ﬁrst simulate the transition process
and ﬁnd the transition probabilities. This yield the following transition ma-
trix :

πuu πue
πeu πee

 =

 0.50749 0.49251
0.03708 0.96292


With this matrix, we derive an unemployment rate of 7%.
In the conditional approach, we use our deﬁnitions of transition probabilities
to derive the following transition matrix :

πuu πue
πeu πee

 =

 0.53423 0.46577
0.03685 0.96315


With this matrix, we derive an unemployment rate of 7.33%.
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